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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A right to freedom of expression is an essential element in any democratic society. It not 
only gives substance to the individual rights of freedom of conscience and individual 
autonomy, but also fosters an unencumbered press as a necessary watchdog of the 
activities of the state,1 which, in a free society, must always be denied unfettered power.2 
This freedom of expression cannot be absolute, however, for words, signs and pictures 
PD\EHDVKDUPIXOWRRWKHUSHRSOH¶VOHJLWLPDWHLQWHUHVWVDVILVWVNQLYHVDQGEXOOHWV6RWKH
law has long played a role in balancing free expression with a variety of other rights and 
interests, such as dignity, reputation and due legal process.3 
 The rights to be weighed against each other have recently been constitutionalized4 
and, in the process, the focal point of the balance has inevitably shifted from that 
underlying the common law.5 Lord Steyn has suggested that, as a result of the new 
landscape of human rights in the United Kingdom (and the same comment could equally 
EHPDGHRIWKHQHZFRQVWLWXWLRQDOODQGVFDSHLQ6RXWK$IULFDµIUHHGRPRIH[SUHVVLRQLV
the rule and regulation of speech LVWKHH[FHSWLRQUHTXLULQJMXVWLILFDWLRQ¶6  
 The justifications for regulating speech in the interests of due legal process 
(primarily, the rules of contempt of court) form no part of this chapter, which is, rather, 
concerned with the limitations to free VSHHFK PDGH QHFHVVDU\ E\ WKH ODZ¶V UROH LQ
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protecting the personality rights of individuals such as their right to reputation, dignity 
and privacy. This chapter is divided into two sections. It deals first with defamation (the 
unlawful infringement of the right to reputation, sometimes itself seen as a species of 
dignity) and then with other attacks on personality. There is a necessary overlap between 
these two sections since defamation can itself be seen (and, perhaps, ought so to be seen) 
as the paradigmatic attack on personality. The unifying theme is, therefore, that of 
personality protection. 
 
 
II. DEFAMATION7 
 
1. The interests protected by defamation 
 
The first step in understanding defamation is to identify the interest that the law is 
seeking to protect and, as is usual but not inevitable in that endeavour, it is to the Roman 
law that both the Scottish and South African lawyer must turn. The Romans recognized 
two quite distinct but closely related interests as worthy of protection ² reputation, that 
is to say, the esteem in which we are held by others, and self-worth, that is to say the 
esteem in which we hold ourselves. These two interests were recognized for different 
reasons and protected in different ways. Reputation was seen as a valuable commodity 
and its impairment could lead both to sentimental loss, where the actio injuriarum based 
on animus injuriandi (intention) was available, and to patrimonial loss. Self-worth, on the 
RWKHU KDQG ZDV VHHQ DV D SDUW RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V KXPDQ GLJQLW\ DQG LWV LQIULQJement 
could also be redressed under the actio injuriarum, which provided a remedy for an 
DIIURQWEURXJKWDERXWE\DGHOLEHUDWHDWWDFNRQDSHUVRQ¶VGLJQLW\8 
 The distinction between the actio injuriarum and the Aquilian action in South 
Africa reflects the Roman law differentiation between sentimental (i.e. non-patrimonial) 
interests in physical integrity, reputation and dignity (including privacy), on the one hand, 
and economic interests, on the other hand. In an action for defamation, there was, 
furthermore, a resistance to describing verbal attacks on dignity as defamation.9 
However, the absence of any specific reference in the constitutional protection of rights 
in South Africa to 'reputation' eo nomine, has led the courts there to recognize that the 
concept of dignity (protected in s 10 of the South African Constitution)10 is broad enough 
to include the protection of 'reputation' as well.11  
 Scots law, on the other hand, has vacillated between emphasizing one interest or 
the other12 and, in practice, modern Scots law recognizes defamation as a single action 
protecting both reputation and dignity.13   
 7KHFRDOHVFHQFHRIWKHWZRGRFWULQDOO\VHSDUDWHULJKWVRIµUHSXWDWLRQ¶DQGµGLJQLW\¶
LV UHYHDOHG LQ WKH 6FRWWLVK DSSURDFK WR FDVHV RI µSULYDWH¶ GHIDPDWLRQ LQ Zhich 
communication is to the pursuer alone. The affront felt by the pursuer may found an 
action for damages as an infringement of the legally-protected interest of self-esteem or 
dignity. Scots law clearly regards such an action as being located within the parameters 
RIµGHIDPDWLRQ¶HYHQLQWKHDEVHQFHRIHFRQRPLFORVV14 and there is no indication today 
that private defamation is subject to any different test for actionability from publicly 
announced defamatory statements. So Mackay v. McCankie,15 the classic private 
GHIDPDWLRQFDVHZDVDUJXHGDQGGHFLGHGH[SOLFLWO\DVDFDVHRIµVODQGHU¶DQGQRWDV7%
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Smith has it,16 RIµLQVXOW¶,QVXOWZDVWUHDWHGDVPHUHO\WKHIRUPRIORVVVXIIHUHGWKURXJK
the wrong rather than, as in Roman law, the wrong itself. 
 South African law, on the other hand, denies that private communication is 
defamation (for there, as in English law, publication is perceived as the essence of 
defamation). However, it has no difficulty in awarding damages: the delict being that of 
an innominate impairment of dignity. But, of course, what we call the action is next to 
irrelevant ² the important issue is the basis of liability. And if the matter continues to be 
seen as falling under the actio injuriarum then (at least on a doctrinal level) only 
intention to injure would suffice to found the action. However, although a theoretical 
distinction is drawn in South Africa between the Aquilian action and the actio 
injuriarum, in practice the position is closer to the Scottish approach for it is not 
necessary to bring a separate Aquilian action where economic loss results from 
defamation. This is evident in cases involving corporate (juristic) plaintiffs in South 
Africa. Artificial legal persons can suffer no hurt feelings or affront (being emotional 
reactions of the mind) but they can, of course, suffer in their patrimony from a loss of 
reputation.17 That loss is recoverable in damages and, though economic loss suggests an 
Aquilian remedy,18 rather than one founded on the actio injuriarum, in South Africa it 
has been held that it is unnecessary to locate the remedy within one or the other, even for 
the purpose of identifying the appropriate form of fault required:19 the action is one for 
defamation and any damages to be awarded are, as always,20 restricted to damage that is 
actually suffered.   
 The coalescence of the protected interests into one action in Scotland and, at the 
very least, the blurring of the lines between them in South Africa reflects the element of 
artificiality involved in separating out two interests that substantially overlap. For it is 
FOHDUWKDWRQH¶VRZQVHOI-esteem is likely to be affected by the reputation one knows one 
holds.21 The result is that an attack on reputation may well have, as a direct and inevitable 
consequence, a lowering of self-esteem. As Cory J put it in the Supreme Court of 
&DQDGD µ*RRG UHSXWDWLRQ LV FORVHO\ UHODWHG WR WKH LQQDWHZRUWKLQHVV DQG GLJQLW\RI WKH
LQGLYLGXDO¶22 And in an insightful analysis of why the (English) law protects reputation, 
Gibbons23 argues that a pHUVRQ¶V ZLVK WR SURWHFW UHSXWDWLRQ GHULYHV IURP KLV RU KHU
broader interests in exerting control over personal information, which the law protects 
EHFDXVH WKH DELOLW\ WR FRQWURO RQH¶V RZQ SXEOLF LPDJH LV DFWXDOO\ DQ DVVHUWLRQ RI
autonomy.24  Therefore it is, perhaps, no surprise that the modern law does not (or 
cannot) distinguish as clearly as the Romans did between the two interests, though the 
law in South Africa appears to cling, at least doctrinally, to the distinction far more than 
does the law in Scotland.  
 Yet a failure to distinguish clearly between overlapping, but essentially distinct, 
interests does have a number of drawbacks. For one thing it becomes entirely unclear 
which basis of liability (culpa for the economic interest of reputation or animus 
injuriandi for the personality interest of dignity) becomes appropriate when both interests 
can be vindicated by the same action. In addition, it misses the pleasing symmetry that 
exists in granting different levels of protection, through the form of fault required, to the 
different interests - DQDSSURDFKWKDWZRXOGDOORZWKHODZWRUHIOHFWVRFLHW\¶VYLHZVRIWKH
relative political importance of the interests at issue. There is an irresistible logic in 
locating economic interests within a broader framework of economic protection granted 
by the law of negligence, and there is something inherently suspect in a legal system 
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granting redress for economic loss caused by false words under the law of negligence if 
the words are falsely favourable,25 while granting redress under the law of intent-based 
defamation if the words are falsely unfavourable. 
 The better approach would be to maintain as far as possible a separation between 
economic and personality interests, allowing the former to be protected by the Aquilian 
action based on negligence (bringing in unreasonableness), while affront to reputation, 
dignity or privacy might revert to being regarded as a different action with, entirely 
sensibly, its own policy considerations and a different balance of presumptions and 
defences. This would leave defamation to develop in its own way as a remedy for attacks 
on personality. But, at the end of the day, we must recognize that the life of the law is not 
merely logic but rather experience and there may be merit in the middle ground of 
negligence-based liability for defamation, especially in the context of distributors of 
published matter (already accepted in both systems)26 and also of the media, as the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in the South African case of Bogoshi27 realized and the 
Constitutional Court in Holomisa v. Khumalo v. Holomisa 28 endorsed. 
  
 
2. The elements of the action for defamation 
 
Defamation is a civil wrong attracting damages to compensate for losses suffered when 
one person conveys an idea, by whatever means, of and concerning another person which 
is derogatory or demeaning of the latter and which does not attract one of the various 
defences which might exclude liability.   
In Scots law, once the pursuer has established the defamatory nature of the words 
complained of he or she acquires the benefit of two presumptions: that the words are false 
and that they were communicated with the appropriate degree of fault to found liability.29   
In South African law, once the plaintiff has established the publication of matter 
referring to him or her that is defamatory in nature, he or she also acquires the benefit of 
two presumptions: that the publication was unlawful30 and that the publication was 
accompanied by the appropriate degree of fault to found liability.31 Falsity is not an 
element that the South African plaintiff must prove.32 As in Scots law, it is for the 
defendant to prove truthfulness or the existence of any other defence excluding 
unlawfulness.33 The three elements, common to both systems (though not necessarily 
applied in the same way), that require some detailed consideration are, therefore, 
defamatoriness, falsity and fault. 
 
 
(a) Defamatoriness 
 
The most important element, from which much follows, is the defamatory nature of the 
idea conveyed by the defender or defendant. An action for defamation does not lie unless 
WKH LGHDV FRPPXQLFDWHG DUH µGHIDPDWRU\¶ WKDW LV WR VD\ DUH GHURJDWRU\ RU GHPHDQLQJ
tested objectively. The objective nature of the test was authoritatively captured in the (not 
original) words of Lord Atkin in the House of Lords in the English case of Sim v. 
Stretch,34 WKDWLVWRVD\ZKHWKHUWKHZRUGVFRPSODLQHGRIµWHQGWRORZHUWKHSODLQWLIILQWKH
estimation of right-WKLQNLQJ PHPEHUV RI VRFLHW\ JHQHUDOO\¶35 It is for the court to 
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GHWHUPLQH KRZ µULJKt-WKLQNLQJ¶ PHPEHUV RI VRFLHW\ ZRXOG UHDFW WR SDUWLFXODU ZRUGV
Where the per se meaning of words36 is relied upon, the issue is neither how members of 
society do react nor how the pursuer or plaintiff did react, but how this judicial 
anthropomorphization of a legal standard would react. An example may make this clear 
(one chosen indeed to illustrate the further point that, in assessing the defamatory quality 
of particular words both times and attitudes change). There is little doubt that in days 
(happily) gone by, an allegation of homosexuality would result in even rational and 
UHDVRQDEOHSHRSOHEHLQJOHVVZLOOLQJWRDVVRFLDWHZLWKWKHSHUVRQVRµWDLQWHG¶37 Nowadays 
the matter is far less clear, and a court could hold that an accusation of homosexuality is 
defamatory only if one were willing to say that it is an ordinary decent thing to estimate 
the inherent worth of gay and lesbian people to be less than that of non-gay people.38 On 
a strict application of Sim, it ought not to be sufficient to allege that some people, bigots 
and the like, would have a lower opinion of a pursuer subject to such an allegation. 
The Constitutional Court in South Africa has signalled that constitutionally-
entrenched norms and values will affect broader decisions in the law of delict, for 
instance, on the scope of unlawfulness.39 The decision of Goldstein J in Sokhulu v. New 
Africa Publications Ltd40 has affirmed that constitutional values will also have an effect 
on determining the views of the right-thinking person in the test for assessing the 
defamatory content of matter. His judgment highlights the fact that the defamatory 
content of matter will vary with the temper of the times and, of course, that the effect of 
the Constitution must now be considered, especially those cases involving the 
GHWHUPLQDWLRQRIKRZD µULJKW-WKLQNLQJ¶RU µUHDVRQDEOHSHUVRQ¶ZRXOG UHDFW7KH µULJKW-
WKLQNLQJ¶SHUVRQLVDFFRUGLQJWR*ROGVWHLQ-µVRPHRQHZKRVXEVFULEHVWRWKHQRUPVDQG
YDOXHV RI WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ¶ ,W LV OLNHO\ WKDW WKH VDPH FRPPHQW FRXOG QRw be made in 
Scotland in respect of the norms and values embodied in the European Convention on 
Human Rights.41 
7KHTXHVWLRQRIZKDW LVPHDQWE\ µVRFLHW\JHQHUDOO\¶ LV OHVV LPSRUWDQW LQ VPDOO
fairly homogenous societies (such as Scotland), than in large heterogenous countries (like 
South Africa). In both, however, there is authority for the proposition that the right-
thinking member of society is defined according to the section of society to which the 
pursuer or plaintiff belongs.42 In Scotland, Guthrie Smith said that an injury to character 
PD\EHFDXVHGµE\WKHIDOVHLPSXWDWLRQRIVXFKDFWVDVPD\ORZHUKLPLQWKHHVWLPDWLRQ
of the public, or make his society shunned by those with whom he is accustomed to 
DVVRFLDWH¶43 and Lord McLaren talked of the standarGVRISURSULHW\ DFFHSWHG µDPRQJVW
WKH FODVV RI SHUVRQV WR ZKLFK WKH LQGLYLGXDO DJJULHYHG EHORQJV¶44 In South Africa the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Mahomed v. Jassiem45 held that the Sim v. Stretch 
formulation embodies a segmental approach, which includes reference to the views of a 
substantial and respectable section of the community. So in determining whether a right-
thinking person would in fact regard an allegation as defamatory, the view (albeit 
conservative, or even prejudiced) of a section of the community in which the plaintiff 
lives or works may become relevant, either by applying the sectional test laid down in 
Mahomed or by relying on a secondary meaning (or innuendo) in order to elicit a 
defamatory meaning. Thus, it would be defamatory to allege that a person had had an 
extra-marital affair within a morally very conservative community or where the 
allegation was made against a person who was known to be a priest who had taken a vow 
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of celibacy (on the sectional test in the first case and on an innuendo of breaking vows in 
the second).   
However, it would be inconsistent with constitutional norms in South Africa if the 
sectional test allowed the court to endorse anti-constitutional sentiments, even if held by a 
ODUJHQXPEHURISHRSOHDVµULJKW-thinkiQJ¶46 A better analysis of the sectional test might 
be to see it as an elaboration of, rather than as a qualification to, the objectivity rule, 
DPRXQWLQJ WR D UHFRJQLWLRQ WKDW WKH µULJKW-WKLQNLQJ¶ SHUVRQ PXVW EH SODFHG LQ WKH
circumstances of the pursuer oU SODLQWLII MXVW DV WKH µUHDVRQDEOH SHUVRQ¶ LQ QHJOLJHQFH
cases will be modified according to the circumstances facing the defender or defendant. 
This approach accepts that the right thinking person expects more of some people than 
others and reacts to the same words differently depending upon the context in which, and 
about whom, they are made. But it also carries the necessary limitation that the 
circumstances into which the right-thinking person must be projected in order to assess 
whether the pursuer or plaintiff is entitled to feel affronted are confined to external 
circumstances (such as age, physical capacities and professional qualifications) rather 
than internal circumstances (such as personal beliefs or attitudes).47     
 
 
(b) Truthfulness 
 
Once it has EHHQHVWDEOLVKHGWKDWWKHZRUGVXVHGE\WKHGHIHQGHUDUHµGHIDPDWRU\¶LQWKH
sense described above, Scots law presumes that they are false, because it presumes 
everyone to be free from derogatory characteristics. The practical effect of this is that the 
onus is shifted onto the defender to show, as a defence, that the words are not false. It is 
important to note that this is merely a presumption, which shifts the onus of proof, and it 
can, therefore, be rebutted by the defender establishing the truth of the allegation. 
Nevertheless the end result is odd. In most other delictual actions the pursuer is obliged to 
prove each of the definitional elements of his or her case before the onus shifts to the 
defender to prove, if he or she can, an appropriate defence. Yet with defamation, though, 
falsity is one of the definitional elements, once the defamatory quality of the statement is 
proved by the pursuer the element of falsity (together with fault, which is considered 
below) is presumed to exist, thus throwing the onus of disproving falsity onto the 
defender. 
The South African law resembles the Scots law on onus. There, truth for the 
public benefit is one of the defences excluding unlawfulness48 and the burden is on the 
defendant to prove the existence of a defence excluding unlawfulness.49 However, under 
both the common law and the constitutional constraints of free speech in South Africa, 
falsity is not an element to be proved by the plaintiff.50 It is a factor affecting 
unlawfulness and the defendant must prove truthfulness, where that issue is relevant. 
In Scots law the appropriate defence is that of veritas or, simply, truth. The truth 
of the allegation justifies in legal terms its communication. This was, however, not 
always the case: until the early 19th century there was some doubt as to whether truth 
provided an absolute defence.51 This doubt probably arose as a result of a confusion of 
the legal responses to defamation. While defamation was a criminal as well as a civil 
wrong52 (and therefore an act harmful to the public peace as well as to private self-
esteem) it was by no means self-evident that only falsehoods would require a legal 
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reaction. Yet the civil law alone could not in logic accommodate actions (at least for 
defamation) based on truth. For one thing the original civil remedy of palinode (or 
recantation, often at the church door) required falsity, since a defender could not be 
ordained by a church court53 to recant from what could be shown to be the truth.54 And in 
addition, as the protection of reputation came to be at least as important as protection of 
dignity, truth became an absolute defence on the ground that the law had no role in 
protecting a reputation that was not deserved.55 
In South Africa the equivalent defence is not truth simpliciter EXW µWUXth for the 
SXEOLFEHQHILWRULQWHUHVW¶DOORZLQJWKHODZWRUHVSRQGDSSURSULDWHO\WRFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQ
which it is not in the public interest to allow the truth to be published.56 Since the 
watershed judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Bogoshi,57 it is clear that in South 
Africa, as in the United States after New York Times v. Sullivan,58 the public interest may, 
in very special circumstances, justify publication of inaccurate material to a greater extent 
than the normal rule in defamation,59 namely that a defender or defendant can get away 
with minor inaccuracies so long as the major part of the communication is true. Hefer JA 
in Bogoshi recognized that in some cases, where the disclosure is on a matter of burning 
public concern, the need to publish before establishing the truth in a positive manner can 
be a factor in determining the overall lawfulness of the publication.60 However, he 
emphasized the high degree of circumspection placed on editors and editorial staff and 
WKDWWKHUHZDVQRµOLFHQFHWRORZHUWKHVWDQGDUGVRIFDUH¶61 
The result is that truth alone is not an absolute defence to an action for defamation 
in South Africa (as it is in Scotland), nor is falsity alone sufficient (in either country) for 
liability.62 This limitation on the publication of the truth has not, in practice, imposed an 
excessive fetter on freedom of expression in South Africa but has, rather, placed a 
restriction (which we regard as justifiable) on some truthful disclosures about the past 
actions of private individuals, which tKH FRXUWV KDYH KHOG KH RU VKH LV HQWLWOHG WR µOLYH
GRZQ¶63 The recognition of a policy-based, public benefit restriction on the publication 
of truthful matter about a person also provides South African law with a better basis for 
developing pragmatic limits for the protection of privacy than Scots law. This is a matter 
to which we will return. 
 
 
(c) Fault 
 
One of the most curious features of defamation is the difficulty that the modern law has 
had in establishing a wholly satisfactory criterion for fault. A strict application of the 
Roman law would have made this relatively straight-forward ± the affront element, based 
as it is on the actio injuriarum, would attract damages on a showing of animus injuriandi 
(wrongful intent to injure); while the reputational element of the action involves a matter 
of economic worth, would be based on the lex Aquilia and would require culpa (or fault 
in the wider sense of including culpable but unintentional acts, that is to say negligence). 
However, as we have already seen, the modern law does not make this distinction quite 
as neatly as the Romans did and in both Scotland and South Africa the law is content to 
award damages for the infringement of both interests on the basis of only one or other of 
the different forms of fault. Furthermore, the Bogoshi judgment64 in South Africa has 
tended to blur the neat lines between the Aquilian action and the actio injuriarum.    
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There are a number of options for fault, ranging from proven intention65 through 
presumed intention to negligence. Depending upon the circumstances, the law in both 
jurisdictions has for long contained examples of all three. So in a case of qualified 
privilege the pursuer or plaintiff must show that the defender or defendant intended to 
injure him. In a case that does not concern privilege, that intention is presumed (in Scots 
law irrebuttably, in South African law rebuttably). And in a case of communication by 
dissemination of material over which the defender or defendant has no control, 
negligence is the foundation of liability.66 But how the various options are spread 
throughout the law is one of the major differences of approach between Scots and South 
African law. 
In Scots law liability in cases that do not concern situations of privilege is 
theoretically based on wrongful intent, but that theory wilts under close scrutiny since not 
only is the fault element of the claim, called intent or (sometimes) malice,67 presumed in 
favour of the pursuer (because bad intent is seen as an inescapable inference from the act 
itself)68 but that presumption is irrebuttable with the result that it helps the defender not 
one whit to plead that he or she did not, or even could not, intend to injure the pursuer.   
This rule, which we may call the rule of strict liability, is often traced to the 
English House of Lords decision of Hulton v. Jones,69 but in fact in Scotland is far older. 
There is a series of cases, all involving newspapers as defenders, in which names had 
been published referring to one person but which could be taken to refer to other persons 
with identical or similar names, and in which the honesty of the newspaper publishers (in 
the sense of lack of any positive intention to injure the pursuer) was held to provide no 
defence.   
Blackie suggests70 that it was the very development of newspapers in the 18th 
century that moved the law from animus (which newspapers and their corporate owners 
cannot have) to strict liability. In other words it was an accidental rather than deliberate 
GHYHORSPHQW ZKHUHE\ µWKH ODZ VOLSSHG LQWR VWULFW OLDELOLW\¶71 The earliest example is 
typical. Finlay v. Ruddiman72 concerned a newspaper report that one John Finlay, 
shoemaker, had been charged with rape. The pursuer was a shoemaker of that name, but a 
different person altogether, and it was held that the newspaper had no defence to the 
effect that it had not intended to defame the pursuer (of whom it knew nothing) but only 
to report a fact concerning the other man.73 However, Lord Kames is reported by Guthrie 
Smith74 DVVD\LQJLQWKLVFDVHWKDWµGDPDJHVPD\Ee founded on culpa without an animus 
injuriandi¶7KLVVXJJHVWVWKDWZKLOHDFWXDOLQWHQWZDVQRWQHFHVVDU\DOHVVHUIRUPRIIDXOW
would be sufficient ² but still (and this is the point) necessary.75 The case is not in itself 
authority for strict liability. Nor is Craig v. Hunter & Co,76 where a similar mistake was 
immediately retracted by the newspaper and an apology offered. The court held that 
damages were not due unless either intent on the part of the newspaper could be shown 
by the pursuer or patrimonial loss could be shown to have been suffered as a result of 
µLQDGYHUWHQFHRUQHJOLJHQFH¶,QRWKHUZRUGVsolatium required animus injuriandi while 
the redress of patrimonial loss required culpa in a wider sense, including negligence. This 
was still thought to be the law half a century later77 but, while it reflects fairly accurately 
the Roman law approach, it does not suggest strict liability (i.e. liability even in the 
absence of negligence) for either patrimonial or emotional loss. However, Hume78 had 
earlier indicated an understanding of the law nearer to strict liability and the coalescence 
of the two interests protected by defamation led inexorably to a concomitant coalescence 
 9 
of the different fault requirements into one apparently based on animus injuriandi, though 
presumed irrebuttably. Negligence as an alternative means of establishing liability (or at 
least lack of either intent or negligence as a means of establishing a defence) would seem 
to be no longer possible in Scotland after the Court of Session accepted Hulton v. Jones 
in Wragg v. DC Thomson & Co Ltd79 WKHµ*HRUJH5HHYHV6KRRWV:LIH¶&DVH 
In South Africa the strict liability rule took far longer to be accepted and, when it 
was, that acceptance was subject to much narrower circumstances and, in the event, 
proved to be short-lived.   
In Maisel v. Van Naeren80 a genuine but mistaken belief in the existence of a 
privileged occasion was held to amount to a valid defence ± and such subjectivity is 
clearly incompatible with strict liability. And in Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie v. 
2¶0DOOH\,81 the Appellate Division expressly accepted the principle that liability for 
defamation required consciousness of the wrongfulness of the publication: it was an 
intent-based delict that could not be committed through mere negligence (though lack of 
negligence would protect distributors of already published material, such as news vendors 
or book sellers). However, the Court went on to hold, obiter, that in cases involving the 
mass media, the defendant should be subject to strict liability (i.e. the presumption of 
intent could not be overturned). That suggestion was made the basis of the decision in 
Pakendorf v. De Flamingh82 and from then (1982) until that case was overruled by 
National Media Ltd v. Bogoshi83 in 1998, strict liability was a feature of South African 
law. However, it always was more limited than in Scots or English law, having been 
UHVWULFWHGWRµPHGLDGHIHQGDQWV¶ 
Now, the rule of strict liability is particularly problematic in relation to certain 
types of action where it is especially important that freedom of expression be given as 
high a regard as possible.84 Representative democracies require, even demand, for their 
legitimacy that there be free speech, especially freedom to disseminate as widely as 
possible criticisms of those democratically elected to represent the people. A free press is 
the best way to ensure freedom of expression. But a media that can be held liable in 
damages for publishing false facts, when the publication was made in good faith 
furtherance of political debate, is a media at serious risk of illegitimate stifling. The 
obvious advantages of a familiar, flexible standard of the reasonableness of the 
publication (taking into account, inter alia WKHµQDWXUHRI WKH LQIRUPDWLRQRQZKLFh the 
allegations were based and the reliability of their source, as well as the steps taken to 
YHULI\ WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ « DQG WKH RSSRUWXQLW\ JLYHQ WR WKH SHUVRQ FRQFHUQHG WR
UHVSRQG¶85 are manifold. Emphasis on such a supple criterion would set more realistic 
bounds for journalistic responsibility and free expression86 than either a strict liability 
extreme or a free speech approach based on a necessarily artificial distinction between 
class of plaintiff (as, for example, in the United States of America).87 It is this 
consideration, expressed in a variety of different ways, leading to a variety of approaches, 
that underpins the jurisprudence of all the legal systems that once embraced, but have 
since moved away from, strict liability. 
In the United States of America, for example, a distinction has, since forty years, 
EHHQPDGHEHWZHHQ µSXEOLFRIILFLDOVRU ILJXUHV¶ DQGSULYDWHSHUVRQVDQG WKH IRUPHUGR
not have the benefit of any presumption of malice or intent to injure, far less an 
irrebuttable presumption.88 The category of person covered by this rule never was 
susceptible to ready delineation and the movement in the United States, since the decision 
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in Sullivan, has been one of inexorable expansion of the category.89 This expansion, 
while scarcely principled, does indicate a growing distrust of the strict liability rule, 
which distrust has manifested itself in other ways too.90 The courts in Australia and New 
=HDODQGKDYHGHSDUWHGIURPWKHVWULFW OLDELOLW\UXOHLQPDWWHUVRIµSROLWLFDOGLVFXVVLRQ¶91 
replacing it with a reasonableness test (the onus resting with the defendants to show that 
they acted reasonably);92 and the Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa abolished 
strict liability in the only cases to which it applied there, that is to say, with media 
defendants.93 Yet media defendants continue to be treated differently from individual 
defendants in South Africa for, once strict liability goes, the problem remains of how to 
establish fault. Intention never is satisfactory when dealing with corporate rather than 
natural defendants, and it is not obvious how to strike the balance of fairness in cases in 
which plaintiffs are accidentally but actually harmed by media reports (such as where the 
SODLQWLII¶VQRQ-exclusive name is used to refer to someone else). 
The solution of the Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa in Bogoshi was to 
turn to the concepts of unreasonableness and negligence for media liability. If a media 
defendant fails to show that it exercised an appropriate degree of care (that is to say if it 
acted with culpa) in publishing the inaccuracy complained of, it will be held liable in 
damages for the loss of reputation (and impaired dignity or privacy) the plaintiff suffers 
as a result of the publication. The plaintiff need not show animus injuriandi and harm 
will be presumed to follow the making of the injurious statements. The onus is on the 
defendant to negative culpa, since the issues of neglect and unlawfulness are 
intertwined.94 The Court, interestingly, emphasized that this decision was based on a 
development of the common law, which it found, in its new, developed, form, to be in 
conformity with the norms and values of the Constitution, and the Constitutional Court 
subsequently affirmed that the Bogoshi approach is compatible with constitutional 
values.95  
The shift from strict liability to a reasonableness/negligence-based inquiry is 
much more than a shift in the onus of proof or even in the doctrinal basis of liability. It 
necessitates, in addition, a complete refocusing of the very purpose of the law of 
GHIDPDWLRQIRUWKHFRXUW¶VLQTXLU\LVQRORQJHULQWRZKDWWKHSODLQWLIILVDOOHJHGWRKDYH
done or omitted to do but also into what the defendant did or omitted to do. The outcome 
LVQRWRQO\DYLQGLFDWLRQRURWKHUZLVHRIWKHSODLQWLII¶VUHSXWDWLon, nor a restoration in the 
eyes of himself or others of his dignity, but is a vindication (or otherwise) of the 
GHIHQGDQW¶V SURIHVVLRQDO VWDQGDUGV DQG MRXUQDOLVWLF SUDFWLFHV )RU WKLV UHDVRQ DORQH WKH
South African Supreme Court of Appeal96 and the Constitutional Court97 have been wise 
to apply this subtle new approach only to media defendants. 
It may be noted that, with its long history of strict liability, Scots law provides 
examples of its application only in relation to media defenders. It is tempting, but 
ultimately unpersuasive, to argue that, therefore, in Scotland as was the case in South 
Africa, the strict liability rule is limited to media defenders. But there is no hint of such a 
limitation to strict liability, even obiter, in any of the cases98 and it is likely that Scots law 
will follow Reynolds v. Times Newspapers99 so that strict liability for the media is likely 
to be with us for some time.   
The approach urged on the court by the defendants in Reynolds was not to specify 
the types of defendants (either public figures or media defendants) who would not be 
subject to the risks of strict liability but, within the context of an extension of the defence 
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of qualified privilege, to specify the kinds of statements that would no longer attract 
liability in the absence of a showing of malice.  Qualified privilege has the effect in 
English (and Scots) law of removing the irrebuttability of the presumption of malice (or 
intent to injure), leaving it to the pursuer to prove (if she can) that the defender intended 
to injure her. The defendants in Reynolds sought to persuade the English courts to extend 
WKLVSULYLOHJHWRZKDWZDVGHVFULEHGDVµSROLWLFDOGLVFXVVLRQ¶7KLVDSSURDFKDWWHPSWLQJ
WR LQWURGXFH FRQFHSWV RI UHDVRQDEOHQHVV LQWR WKH µSULYLOHJH¶ HQTXLU\ has noticeable 
similarities to the South African approach that was accepted in Bogoshi, but would not 
have been limited to media defendants.  
The Court of Appeal in Reynolds DFFHSWHG WKHGHIHQGDQWV¶ DUJXPHQW100 but the 
House of Lords did not. One of the major considerations influencing their Lordships was 
that, since newspapers (and other media publishers) in the United Kingdom cannot be 
IRUFHG WR GLYXOJH WKHLU VRXUFHV LW ZRXOG EH µXQDFFHSWDEO\ GLIILFXOW IRU D YLFWLP RI
defamatory and false allegations of fDFWWRSURYHUHFNOHVVGLVUHJDUGRIWKHWUXWK¶101 Lord 
Cooke of Thornton was (sensibly) dubious as to how the new category of privilege could 
EHOLPLWHGWRµSROLWLFDOGLVFXVVLRQ¶102 He was worried both by the difficulties of defining 
the boundaries of the category and of the logic of doing so. The House of Lords did, 
however, accept103 that politicians are expected to be robust in the face of strenuous 
criticism, more so indeed than private individuals.104 
The House of Lords in Reynolds rejected the argument for what was there 
GHVFULEHG DV D µJHQHULF¶ TXDOLILHG SULYLOHJH IRU SROLWLFDO VSHHFK +HIHU -$ LQ Bogoshi 
seemed to lean towards just such a generic privilege applying to the media in 
FRPPXQLFDWLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ E\ HPSKDVL]LQJ WKDW LW LV WKH µULJKW DQG LQGHHG D vital 
function, of the press to make available to the community information and criticism about 
every aspect of public, political, social and economic activity and thus to contribute to the 
IRUPDWLRQRISXEOLFRSLQLRQ¶105  
Nevertheless, the judgments of Lord Steyn and Lord Cooke in Reynolds 
demonstrate that the apparent divide, on the correct approach to media coverage of 
political speech, between Bogoshi in South Africa (and Lange in Australia and New 
Zealand), on the one hand, and Reynolds in England, on the other hand, is not as 
significant as might at first sight appear. Lord Steyn, in fact, acknowledged the similarity 
between the above approaches by redefining the duty/interest inquiry in cases of alleged 
privileged occasion as including broad issues of policy (such as failure to report the other 
side,106 WKDW WKH RFFDVLRQ PXVW EH RQH WKDW FDQ µIDLUO\ EH VDLG WR EH LQ WKH SXEOLF
LQWHUHVW¶107 and the fact that the limits of free speech are wider in regard to criticism of 
politicians than private individuals).108 Lord Cooke, although relying on the standard test 
of reciprocal interest, duty and common interest,109 nevertheless underscored the flexible 
nature of this test in accommodating all circumstances and in meeting new situations, 
including those where the media might lay claim to a defence of qualified privilege.110 
Lord Cooke also observed111 that this approach did not differ much from the Australian 
reasonableness test (or, one might add, the South African reasonableness test). 
In the end, the differences between the English, Australian and South African 
approaches to the ambit of qualified privilege to political information communicated by 
the media is essentially one of emphasis, rather than substance.112 Perhaps the only 
remaining difference between the Reynolds approach and that in the other jurisdictions is 
that it clearly endorses a judicially-controlled, incremental ex post facto development of 
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the list of categories of duty/interest rather than the Australian and South African stance 
that does not, in advance, foreclose on extending the scope of the defence of privileged 
occasion to political speech in the media.  
 
 
III. OTHER ATTACKS ON PERSONALITY 
 
1. Pushing the boundaries of defamation 
 
The law of defamation dominates in Scotland, and consequently, accommodating as it is 
to personality interests, it has tended to preclude the possibility of actionability of other 
attacks on self-esteem and honour being actionable under different heads. Pursuers have 
(for perfectly understandable tactical reasons) sought to bring their cases within the 
recognized action for defamation rather than to seek to persuade the court to develop new 
actions (or, perhaps, to rediscover old ones), but the drawback of this is that both the 
cases and the action itself have had to be distorted in order to accommodate the interests 
which the Scottish courts appear perfectly willing, at heart, to recognize.   
One can see both the willingness and the distortion very clearly in cases such as 
the well-known English decision of Tolley v. Fry & Sons Ltd,113 where a professional 
golfer sued when his image was used without his consent to advertise chocolate. Since 
WKH DELOLW\ WR FRQWURO RQH¶V RZQ LPDJH LV QRW H[SOLFLWO\ D OHJDOO\SURWHFWHG LQWHUHVW WKH
plaintiff was forced to squeeze his claim into one for defamation, arguing that the misuse 
of his image contained the innuendo that he had sold his amateur status (this at a time 
when sportsmen were either (amateur) gentlemen or (paid) players, but certainly not 
both). The artificiality of this approach is highlighted by a comparison of the case with a 
similar South African decision, 2¶.HHIIHv. Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd114 in 
which the plaintiff sued a publisher who had used a photograph of her without her 
consent in its advertisement for guns. Here, because South African law has a more 
developed law of personality rights, the court was able to be more candid and hold that a 
misappropriation of someone's image was in itself a wrong.115 The English court, on the 
other hand (and the Scottish court would have done the same),116 had to pretend that 
7ROOH\¶V claim was for defamation in order to provide redress for the quite separate wrong 
of misappropriation of image, an archetypical form of attack on a personality right.117  
In a slightly different way, the same phenomenon can be seen in the manner in 
which the courts apply the very test for defamatoriness. As we have seen, the Sim v. 
Stretch test is designed to provide an objective criterion against which to test what is 
actionable. Yet increasingly damages have been awarded for statements which the 
plaintiff finds personally offensive but which rationally cannot satisfy the test of lowering 
the pursuer in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. A good example is the 
English decision of Berkoff v. Burchill118 in which an allegation that the plaintiff (an 
DFWRUZDV µKLGHRXVO\XJO\¶ZDV DOORZHG WRJR WR D MXU\119 Such an allegation may, of 
FRXUVHEHSHUVRQDOO\KXUWIXODQGFDXVHVHULRXVDIIURQWEXWLWLVGLIILFXOWWRVHHKRZµULJKW-
WKLQNLQJ¶PHPEHUVRIVRFLety could think less of the plaintiff, either as a person or as an 
actor, because someone else has publicly expressed what, almost by definition, is a 
personal opinion.120 The court is, in our view, trying here to provide redress for the 
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SODLQWLII¶V DIIURQW and the case is all the more remarkable for coming from a system 
which claims to be based entirely on protection of reputation. 
While one might applaud these British attempts to extend the protection afforded 
to personality interests, the method adopted to do so is far from attractive. And the 
problem is not only, or even primarily, one of honesty. It is, in our view, right and proper 
that the courts should develop a protection for personality rights such as dignity, control 
RIRQH¶VLPDJHDQGSULYDF\7Ke fundamental difficulty is that if they do so by squeezing 
such cases into the action for defamation they are forced to accept the limitations and 
peculiarities of that action, which might in their own context be justifiable, but which are 
likely to be inappropriate for other interests. In particular, treatment of truth and fault in 
defamation today is unlikely to produce satisfactory results when the action is seeking 
redress for, say, misuse of image. The balance that must always be struck with freedom 
of expression will take account of some interests in the context of defamation, and other 
interests in the context of misuse of image ² and the balance is unlikely to be struck in 
the same place for both. The lessons from South Africa (where the shift from defamation 
to privacy as a potential remedy for certain types of disclosures is well under way) are 
particularly valuable. Persons injured by truthful disclosures are able to frame their 
remedy in terms of invasion of privacy rather than defamation. The court in Sokhulu121 
held, in regard to the alternative claim by the plaintiff that her dignity had been impaired 
E\ WKH DOOHJDWLRQV FRPSODLQHG RI WKDW µGLJQLW\¶ LV MXGJHG QRW RQO\ DFFRUGLQJ WR D
subjective but also an objective concept of reasonableness.122 For the same reasons as the 
court held that the words in Sokhulu were not capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, 
LW DOVR FRQFOXGHG WKDW WKH VWDWHPHQWV LQ TXHVWLRQ ZHUH µQRW UHDVRQDEO\ FDSDEOH RI
FRQYH\LQJDPHDQLQJWKDWWKHSODLQWLIIZDVLQVXOWHG¶123  
 
 
2. Types of personality interests 
 
Burchell124 lists a number of interests that South African law protects as specific 
examples of a more general personality right. He classifies attacks on self-esteem as 
either (i) impairments of dignity (including insult,125 unlawful arrest or detention, 
malicious prosecution, adultery, interference with parental authority and breach of 
promise of marriage) or (ii) invasions of privacy (including unreasonable intrusions into 
the private sphere, public disclosure of private facts, appropriation of likenesses (right to 
identity) and false light in the public eye). This classification provides a useful structure 
for Scots law also. 
 
 
(a) The right to dignity  
 
7KHFRQFHSWRI LQGLYLGXDO µGLJQLW\¶ LVJUDQWHGH[SOLFLWSURWHFWLRQE\ WKH&RQVWLWution of 
South Africa126 and many writers believe that this concept is the underlying principle 
within which concepts such as privacy, self-esteem and reputation are located.127 Though 
Scots law lacks any explicit constitutional (or human rights) protection for dignity,128 it is 
clear that this is, as in South Africa, the underlying interest that justifies an award of 
damages under both defamation, when there is no third party communication, and other 
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related actions, which do not require economic loss for actionability, such as verbal 
injury,129 malicious falsehood or injurious falsehood. These are all clearly affront-based 
delicts and as such they demand proof of wrongful intent to injure. Freedom of the press 
was long ago given as the major reason why this should be so.130 It needs, however, to be 
remembered that in an action for verbal injury, as with the action for defamation, Scots 
law no longer distinguishes between dignity and reputation for the purposes of fault, with 
the result that damages can be sought for the infringement of the economic right (if loss 
can be established) in the same action as redress is sought for the infringement of the 
personality right.131 
There are other actions available to Scottish pursuers who feel that their right to 
dignity has been infringed, though usually these are by acts or omissions rather than by 
words (or, as it might be put, real injuries rather than verbal injuries)132. Indeed, most (but 
not all)133 of the impairments of dignity listed by Burchell above have long been 
actionable in Scotland too. So, for example, wrongful imprisonment, wrongful arrest, 
wrongful prosecution and abuse of civil court process134 will be dealt with in much the 
same way in both systems. Onus might, however, be different.135  
Other than that issue, however, the two systems grant similar protection to 
personality, by providing redress for the affront inherent in being, for example, arrested 
RULPSULVRQHGHWF6RZKLOH6FRWVODZVHHNVµUHDVRQDEOHFDXVH¶DQGPLJKWILQGLWLQODZIXO
authority to act, South AfricDQ ODZ H[SORUHV WKH µXQODZIXOQHVV¶ RI WKH DFWLRQ ILQGLQJ
lawfulness in facts such as the public interest and the legal convictions of the community. 
The doctrinal (or at the very least structural) difference between the two systems seems to 
be that, while Scots law contains a number of disparate wrongs, each, of which can be 
explained (at least partly)136 by the need to protect individuals from affront, South 
African law has a general principle that personality (including self-esteem and dignity) is 
a legally recognized interest, which can be attacked in a number of different ways. 
 
 
(b) Privacy rights 
 
The personality right that conflicts most directly with the principle of freedom of 
expression is that of privacy. This concept, if it is to have meaning beyond existing rights, 
must be conceived broadly enough to include protection of both truthful and non-
defamatory facts. In essence, it is the autonomy right of an individual to control access to, 
and use of, information concerning him or herself. 
Though there was no sophisticated concept of privacy rights in Roman law, the 
actio injuriarum has been accepted in South Africa to include the concept of dignitas, 
embracing privacy, which is explicitly seen as a personality right.137 From the 1950s 
onward in South Africa, the right to be free from public disclosure of private facts138 and 
unreasonable intrusions into the private sphere139 has been recognized by the courts. 
Section 14 of the South African Constitution also protects the right to privacy, which 
includes the right of an individual not to have their person or home searched, their 
property searched or seized and the privacy of their communications infringed. 
Jurisprudence from the Constitutional Court has emphasized a wide interpretation of 
µSULYDF\¶ZKLFKIRFXVHVon the exercise of individual autonomy.140   
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The situation is very different in Scotland where, in common with English law,141 
there has been a strong resistance to developing breach of privacy as an independent 
delict.142 It has, however, long been possible to achieve a certain amount of privacy 
protection by relying on other actions, such as defamation and breach of confidence.   
Defamation in Scotland can accommodate only false allegations. Breach of 
confidence is more useful as a tool to protect accurate but essentially private information 
and it has been recognized in both Scotland and England to be an actionable wrong.143  
Originally confidentiality was recognized in commercial relationships,144 suggesting that 
the action was perceived to be one that protected economic interests. However, a 
relationship that demanded confidentiality that has been recognized at an early stage was 
that between doctor and patient,145 and this relationship cannot easily be explained on the 
EDVLVRIWKHSDWLHQW¶VHFRQRPLFLQWHUHVWV3erhaps even more clearly, the recognition that 
the relationship between spouses146 and even other personal relationships147 could import 
a duty of confidentiality148 illustrates the extent to which confidentiality can protect 
privacy in some circumstances. 
But the action for breach of confidentiality did does have one major limitation. It 
wais available only then the pursuer has passed information to the defender, who has then 
misused it, and it wais not available when the defender seeks out or acquires information 
independently of the pursuer. RMore recently, however, the courts have moved away 
from this requirement149 and by doing so have been able to extend confidentiality to 
cover, effectively, privacy.150 They do, however, continue to claim that it is the former 
rather than the latter that is being protected.151 In light of the European Convention on 
Human Rights there may, however, be little difference in practice between an extended 
conception of confidentiality and privacy.   
In Douglas v. Hello!152 the Court of Appeal held that the time had come for the 
law to accept that existing torts such as breach of confidentiality and defamation were too 
limited to protect some of the interests that the European Convention on Human Rights 
required protecting, and that therefore privacy ought now to be recognized as a legally 
SURWHFWHG LQWHUHVW LQ LWVHOI $V /RUG -XVWLFH 6HGOH\ SXW LW µ:H KDYH UHDFKHG D SRLQW DW
which it can be said with confidence that the law recognizes and will appropriately 
protect a right of personal privDF\¶153 7KHODZLVQRWVWDWLFEXWLQ/RUG-XVWLFH6HGOH\¶V
ZRUGVWKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWVLVWKHµILQDOLPSHWXV¶WRWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRID
right of privacy in English law.154 The House of Lords, however, were quick to point out 
that this approach does not imply any recognition of a new cause of action, or even the 
GHYHORSPHQWRIDµKLJK-OHYHOSULQFLSOHRILQYDVLRQRISULYDF\¶-  rather it is no more than 
an extension, and possible renaming, of the established action for breach of 
confidence.155  IntHUHVWLQJO\ WKHQRWLRQRIµSULYDF\¶, even in this restricted sense, being 
recognized contains exactly the same dichotomy of protected interests that we have seen 
in the case of defamation. Douglas ZDVLQUHDOLW\DFDVHUDLVHGWRSURWHFWWKHSODLQWLIIV¶
economic interests rather than their privacy in its dignity sense.155156   
Yet, in other circumstances, it is the personality infringement that the court is 
clearly concerned about. In R v. Broadcasting Standards Commission, ex parte British 
Broadcasting Corporation156157 Lord Mustill (in the context of a caution that a corporate 
body, which might be entitled to confidentiality as a protection of its economic interests, 
VKRXOGQRWUHDGLO\EHVHHQDVKDYLQJDULJKWWRµSULYDF\¶VDLGWKHIROORZLQJ 
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µ$Q LQIULQJHment of privacy is an affront to the personality, which is damaged 
both by the violation and by the demonstration that the personal space is not 
inviolate.  The concept is hard indeed to define, but if this gives something of its 
flavour I do not see how it can apply to an impersonal corporate body, which has 
QRVHQVLWLYLWLHVWRZRXQGDQGQRVHOIKRRGWRSURWHFW¶157158   
 
Furthermore, in Theakston v. MGN Ltd158159 Ouseley J granted an injunction 
against the publication of photographs of the claimant, taken without his consent during a 
YLVLW WR D EURWKHO EHFDXVH LW µZRXOG EH SDUWLFXODUO\ LQWUXVLYH LQWR WKH FODLPDQW¶V RZQ
LQGLYLGXDO SHUVRQDOLW\¶159160 but at the same time refused an injunction against the 
QHZVSDSHUSXEOLVKLQJWKHVWRU\7KHFODLPDQW¶VUHSXWDWLRQwas not protected by the law, 
but his personality interest was. 
Still to be worked out by the Scottish (and indeed English) courts is the basis of 
liability for invasion of privacy (as an aspect of an extended concept of confidentiality), 
i.e. whether animus or culpa, intent or negligence, is the fault element; the House of 
Lords has indeed recognised that the European Convention on Human Rights does not 
require a remedy in face of any particular level of fault.161 Defamation in Scotland 
provides an unhappy precedent for the muddle made with the basis of liability when the 
two protected interests are treated as one. Differentiating types of defender, as in South 
Africa, rather than the types of loss may well prove an attractive route out of the muddle.   
United Kingdom judges are today faced with an important task ² to construct an 
intellectually sustainable structure within which privacy can be afforded a sensible degree 
of legal protection without interfering disproportionately with competing rights. The 
earlier resistance to such protection is now, paradoxically, an advantage, for it provides 
the judges with a clean slate upon which to work, but they will have to be clear as to both 
policy and principle, harmonizing the various tensions adverted to in this chapter. The 
ultimate outcome remains still uncertain. Perhaps even more importantly, the United 
Kingdom courts have to work out the extent to which a public interest defence is 
applicable to actions for breach of privacy160162 and, again, the South African experience 
may provide useful lessons to draw upon. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Whether there is enough content to the substantive right in Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights to allow the Scottish courts to develop protections for 
personality interests other than privacy remains to be seen, and commentators do need to 
resist the temptation to place more weight on the Convention than it can actually bear. 
However, the lessons from South Africa are clear: an expansive concept of personality 
protection, obviating the need to rely on the action for defamation, would not only allow 
the law to be more transparent and honest but would be better for society as a whole. The 
press would be in a better position clearly to see and acknowledge the boundaries beyond 
which the important, but never absolute, right of free speech will not provide protection. 
The ability to set these boundaries properly, taking account of the appropriate balance of 
free speech, reputation, dignity and privacy, is essential to any democratic legal system in 
the 21st century. 
 17 
 
 18 
 
                                            
1 $UROHGHVFULEHGDVµYLWDO¶E\WKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWVLQBladet Tromsø v.v. Norway (2000) 
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s. 16; in Scotland by the Human Rights Act 1998, incorporating article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
5 In Cox & Griffiths, Petitioners 1998 SCCR 561 the Lord Justice General, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, 
pointed out in a contempt of court case that although a boundary had always existed between freedom of 
expression and the requirements of the due course of justice, article 10 of the ECHR may well require that 
boundary to be redrawn in a place unfamiliar to the law. A part of the argument in National Media Ltd v.v. 
Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) was that not only the common law but also the new constitutional 
guarantee of the right to freedom of speech and expression removed the unlawfulness of inaccurate 
publications where the plaintiff had shown reasonable care. 
6 Reynolds v.v. Times Newspapers Ltd & Ors [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) at 208A-B, [1999] 4 All ER 609 at 
629. See also Lord Woolf CJ in A v.v. B & C March 11, 2002, para. 11(v). 
7 The present authors have contributed to the later 20th Century literature concerning the law of defamation 
in their respective jurisdictions: see Burchell, Defamation and Personality Rights; Norrie, Defamation and 
'Obligations Arising from a Wrongful Act', in Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, vol. 15 (1996), §§paras. 470-
573. 
8 The remedy available under the actio injuriarum for the protection of human dignity is one of the most 
impressive legacies of the Roman law of delict. Human dignity isis surelyalso  at the heart of any human 
rights ideology. A concept of dignity, given a broad interpretation going beyond simply insult (or 
contumelia) embodied in the crystallized categories of impairment of dignity (see below) could, it might be 
argued, also provide an effective basis for a remedy for infringements of dignity manifesting themselves in 
unfairly discriminatory treatment of individuals, sexual harassment and abuse, unlawful dismissal from 
employment, interference with religious beliefs and so on: see Burchell, Personality Rights,, Personality 
Rights, 330-4 (Cf. O' Regan J in Khumalo v.v. Holomisa 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC), para. 26, who 
acknowledges the foundational value of 'dignity' in the South African Constitution para [26]). The remedy 
IRU LPSDLUPHQW RI GLJQLW\ ZDV DYDLODEOH YLD WKH FRPPRQ ODZ HYHQ GXULQJ 6RXWK $IULFD¶V DSDUWKHLG HUD
subject of course to the shackles imposed by the system of parliamentary sovereignty which dominated the 
jurisprudence of that time. The recognition, through the Human Rights Act 1998, of the unlawfulness of 
many of the above infringements of dignity provides Scots law with a basis (if it wishes to use it) for 
developing the common law delictual remedy along similar lines: see the text below,text at n. 131. 
9 See J. M. Burchell, 'The Criteria of Defamation', (1974) 91 SALJ 178.  
10 Act 108 of 1996. 
11 See National Media Ltd v.v. Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA), 1216I-J; Khumalo v.v. Holomisa 2002 
(8) BCLR 771 (CC) , para. [27] and [28]; and the High Court decisions cited in Burchell, Personality 
Rights, n.2, 139. 
12 In the 17th century, Stair, I, 4, 4 limited his discussion to attacks on reputation. Bankton, I, 10, 21 and 24, 
in the 18th century, turned his attention to the general wrong of injury (the Roman injuria) which, including 
LQMXU\ WR WKH SHUVRQ KH GHVFULEHG DV µDQ RIIHQFH PDOLFLRXVO\ FRPPLWWHG¶ DJDLQVW WKH µIDPH GLJQLW\ RU
UHSXWDWLRQ¶RIWKHSXUVXHU+HJRHVRQWRH[SODLQWKDWGDPDJHVPD\EHDZDUGHGZLWKRXWany direct proof of 
WKH TXDQWXP µWKDW EHLQJ KDUGO\ SRVVLEOH¶ SRLQWLQJ WR µLQMXU\¶ DV PRUH D ZURQJ WR SHUVRQDOLW\ WKDQ WR
patrimony. Writing in the 19th century,  Guthrie Smith, The Law of Reparation (1st edn., 1864), 187writing 
in the 19th century, opens KLVFKDSWHURQGHIDPDWLRQE\ UHIHUULQJ WR µWKH ULJKW WRRQH¶VKRQRXUDQGJRRG
QDPH¶(The Law of Reparation (1st edn., 1864, Edinburgh), 187), encapsulating thereby the interests 
GHVFULEHG KHUH DV GLJQLW\ DQG UHSXWDWLRQ LQWR D XQLWDU\ µULJKW¶ &RXUW SUDFWLFe followed this doctrinal 
approach, as can be seen, for example, in Sheriff v.v. Wilson (1855) 17 D 528 where a pursuer sued for 
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GDPDJHVµE\ZD\RIsolatium for the loss and injury caused to him in means, character, credit, reputation, 
feelings and standinJ LQVRFLHW\¶%\ WKH ODWHth century, Professor David M.  Walker, Delict (2nd edn., 
1981), 729 was presenting the purpose of defamation primarily as the vindication of personality rights with 
only a secondary design to protect reputation Delict (2nd edn, 1981), 729. 
13 Smith, Short Commentary, 726 despaired (as he so often did) that what he saw as the pure Roman 
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµLQVXOW¶UHTXLULQJanimusDQGµGHIDPDWLRQ¶UHTXLULQJculpa) could no longer be said 
to represent Scots law. 
14 Norrie, Defamation, 28-9. 
15 (1883) 10 R 537. 
16 Smith, Short Commentary,, 727. 
17 The same, inevitable, conclusion is reached in Scots law: North of Scotland Banking Co v.v. Duncan 
(1857) 19 D 881, 885 per Lord Ardmillan. 
18 From 1977 to 1989 the South African high courts flirted with the idea that the remedy for impairment of 
reputation available to a corporation was, in fact, exclusively aquilian in nature (see Burchell, Defamation, 
42-4). However, in 1989 Rabie ACJ in Dhlomo NO v.v. Natal Newspapers (Pty) Ltd 1989 (1) SA 945 (A) 
reaffirmed the rule, stated by Innes CJ in 1916 in G A Fichardt v.v. The Friend Newspapers Ltd 1916 AD 
1, that a trading corporation can sue for defamation without the need to establish special damage, provided 
it could demonstrate that the offeQGLQJ VWDWHPHQW ZDV µFDOFXODWHG¶ LH OLNHO\ WR FDXVH LW ILQDQFLDO
prejudice. This rule was even extended to political parties in Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v.v. 
Inkatha 1993 (3) SA 579 (A), although subject to the dictates of freedom of expression being considered, 
under the element of unlawfulness, in each particular case. 
19 Caxton v.v. Reeva Forman (Pty) Ltd 1990 (3) SA 547 (A) at 560 per Corbett CJ.  
20 Scots law and South African law maintain an identity in strongly eschewing the Anglo-American notion 
of punitive or exemplary damages. In both systems damages are compensatory, even with general damages 
which are designed to reflect what can reasonably be assumed to have been lost. 
21 6HH53RVWµ7KH6RFLDO)RXQGDWLRQVRI'HIDPDWLRQ/DZ5HSXWDWLRQDQGWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶, (1986) 74 
California LR 691. 
22 Manning v.v. Hill [1995] 126 DLR (4th) 129, 160. True it is, as Shakespeare reminds us, that reputation is 
µ$Q LGOH DQG PRVW IDOVH LPSRVLWLRQ RIW JRW ZLWKRXW PHULW DQG ORVW ZLWKRXW GHVHUYLQJ <RX have lost no 
UHSXWDWLRQDWDOOXQOHVV\RXUHSXWH\RXUVHOIVXFKDORVHU¶Othello, ii, iii, 261-65). 
23 7*LEERQVµ'HIDPDWLRQ5HFRQVLGHUHG¶, (1996) 16 Oxford. Journal. of Legal. Studies. 587 at 589. 
24 This approach is echoed in the interpretation of the &RQVWLWXWLRQDOSURWHFWLRQLQ6RXWK$IULFDRIµGLJQLW\¶
ZKLFKLVVHHQDVSDUWRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VDXWRQRP\WRLQFOXGHµUHSXWDWLRQ¶VHHn.n.11 and n. 2. 
25 As in Hedley Byrne v.v. Heller and Partners [1964] AC (HL) 465 and its progeny. 
26 Infra n.n. 66. 
27 Supra n. 5. The constitutionality of the Bogoshi rule (which bases the media's liability for defamation on 
proof of the absence of negligence or of the reasonableness of the publication) has been affirmed in 
Holomisa 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC), para. [43]. 
28 Supra (n. 2). 
29 Animus injuriandi RIWHQ LQ WKH PRGHUQ ODZ UHQGHUHG DV µPDOLFH¶ WKRXJK ZLWKRXW WKH WHFKQLFDO
connotations that word has in English law) for most defenders, and negligence for innocent disseminators. 
30 The inquiry into unlawfulness (which is, in theory, distinguished from the inquiry into fault, whether in 
the form of intention or negligence) is one based on an ex post facto, public policy, investigation into the 
UHDVRQDEOHQHVVRUXQUHDVRQDEOHQHVVRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFRQGXFW$OWKRXJKWKHLQTXLUy into unlawfulness has 
common ground with the inquiry into negligence in that both inquiries are dominated by assessment of the 
UHDVRQDEOHQHVVRUXQUHDVRQDEOHQHVVRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFRQGXFWWKHXQODZIXOQHVVLVVXHLVEURDGHUWKDQWKH
negligence one. Supple matters of policy, possibly going beyond the factual investigation into 
foreseeability of harm, which is the essence of the negligence inquiry, can be factored into the unlawfulness 
test. Thus, in a defamation case, broad issues of freedom of expression covering the instant and possible 
future cases, can become part of the unlawfulness equation. Similarly, fears of opening the floodgates and 
unduly interfering with the administration of justice can become part of the unlawfulness examination in 
cases of alleged negligent conduct causing pure economic loss. On the concept of unlawfulness in the 
context of infringements of personality rights, see Burchell, Personality Rights, ch. 16 and on unlawfulness 
in a wider context in delict, see the two chapters (by Francois Du Bois and Jonathan Burchell, respectively) 
in Developing Delict²Essays in Honour of Robert Feenstra (2001), Juta Law 1-48 and 99-132. 
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31  Animus injuriandi, or subjective intention to defame, with knowledge of unlawfulness for the individual; 
negligence for innocent disseminators and, more importantly, the media. 
32 It is clear that the common law does not require the plaintiff to prove the falsity of matter that was the 
subject of a defamation action (see Mahomed v.v. Jassiem 1996 (1) SA 673 (A), 694A-B and National 
Media Ltd v.v. National Media Ltd v. Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA), 1218D-E and 1215C-I). As Hefer 
JA correctly stated in Bogoshiµ)DOVLW\RIDGHIDPDWRU\VWDWHPHQWLVQRWDQHOHPHQWRIWKHGHOLFWEXW « its 
truth may be an important fDFWRULQGHFLGLQJWKHOHJDOLW\RILWVSXEOLFDWLRQ¶DW'-E). This has been the 
common law position for many years. See also Selemela v.v. Independent Newspaper Group Ltd 2001 (4) 
SA 987 (NC). The Constitutional Court in Khumalo v.v. Holomisa 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC), affirmed that 
the common law allocation of the onus on the defendant to prove a defence excluding unlawfulness in a 
defamation action placed a justifiable limit on the dictates of freedom of expression, when examined in the 
light of the defence of the 'reasonableness' of the publication recogniserecognized in the Bogoshi argument 
(see also Burchell, Personality Rights, 273)..  
33 Neethling v. Du Preez; Neethling v. The Weekly Mail 1994 (1) SA 708 (A) and National Media Ltd v.v. 
Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA), 1215. 
34 [1936] 2 All ER 1237. 
35 Guthrie Guthrie Smith, (n. 12), 188, gave this as the test in 1864, citing Grotius, ss. 306, as authority. For 
the development of the test in South African law, see Burchell, (1974) 91 SALJ 178n.9. 
36 As opposed to a secondary meaning or innuendo. 
37 See, for example, Kerr v. Kennedy [1942] 1 KB 409; Vermaak v. Van der Merwe  1981 (3) SA 78 (N) 
(allegations of lesbianism, the latter case focusing on the nature of publication to a third party and the 
understanding of the meaning of the words used in South African law); and Richardson v. Walker (1804) 
Hume 623; AB v. XY 1917 SC 15 (respectively, a direct allegation and an innuendo of sodomy). A more 
modern case is that of Prophit v. BBC 1997 SLT 745 in which the court did not question that an allegation 
of lesbianism was defamatory, though in that case the pursuer, being a nun, might be expected by right-
thinking people to be chaste in both deed and thought. In Quilty v. Windsor 1999 SLT 346, 355F Lord 
Kingarth dismLVVHGDFODLPEDVHGRQDQDOOHJDWLRQRIKRPRVH[XDOLW\RQWKHJURXQGWKDWLWµZRXOGQRWQRZ
generally at least be regarded - if it ever was - as defamatory per se¶ (at 355F). 
38 In South Africa, since the Constitution protects rights to sexual orientation in s. 9(3), it is suggested that 
the matter is one of privacy rather than affront and that simple disclosures of sexual orientation, 
unaccompanied by derogatory epithets, should rather be actionable as invasions of privacy. It would seem 
that a false disclosure cannot found a privacy action nor (in Scotland) a truthful one a defamation action. 
39 Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 (4) 
SA 938 (CC). 
40 2001 (4) SA 1357 (W). 
41 Both the South African Constitution and the European Convention are primarily directed towards 
ensuring that states act in particular ways, but the underlying values of both (respect for others, tolerance 
etc) are clearly capable of being subscribed to by individuals - and it is iQ VRFLHW\¶V LQWHUHVWV WKDW OHJDO
doctrine encourages them to do so. 
42 Lord Atkin himself in Sim v. Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237, 1240 pointed out that the test he had just 
SURSRXQGHG µLV FRPSOLFDWHG E\ KDYLQJ WR FRQVLGHU WKH SHUVRQ RU FODVV RI SHUVRQV ZKRVe reaction to the 
SXEOLFDWLRQLVWKHWHVWRIWKHZURQJIXOFKDUDFWHURIWKHZRUGVXVHG¶: n.34, 1240. 
43 Guthrie Smith, (n.12), 188. 
44 Macfarlane v.v. Black & Co (1887) 14 R 870, 873. 
45 1996 (1) SA 673 (A). 
46 Quaere: whether the Constitutional endorsement of tolerance can tolerate the sectional test sanctioning 
LQWROHUDQFH" 6XUHO\ WKH DQVZHU LV RQO\ LI WKH µLQWROHUDQFH¶ LV D YLHZ DGKHUHG WR E\ D µVXEVWDQWLDO DQG
UHVSHFWDEOH VHFWLRQ RI WKH FRPPXQLW\¶ WKH FRXUW WDNLQJ DFFRXQW RI &RQVWLWXWLRQDO QRUPV LQ GHWHUPLning 
ZKDWLVµUHVSHFWDEOH¶ 
47 See Byrne v.v. Dean [1937] 1 KB 818 where personal opinion (on the morality of reporting associates to 
the police) was held not to affect the test for defamatoriness. 
48 A distinction is drawn between defences excluding fault, such as mistake, and defences excluding 
unlawfulness, such as truth for the public benefit. Fault is seen as a subjective concept, while unlawfulness 
is objective. Fair comment, privileged occasion and consent are also defences excluding the unlawfulness 
of a publication although the South African courts have acknowledged that there is no closed list of 
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defences excluding unlawfulness: see National Media Ltd v.v. Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA), and 
Khumalo v. Holomisa n.2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC), para. [18]. The Constitutional Court in Holomisa, [para. 
18] regards the Bogoshi formulation of the criterion of the 'reasonableness' of the publication as providing 
the defendant with a broader type of defence excluding unlawfulness and some commentators on Bogoshi 
consider that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal opens up the possibility of recognising a 
general defence of 'media privilege' in certain circumstances, see below. A South African court has even 
held recently that the amende honorable has not been DEURJDWHGE\GLVXVH LW LV µDOLWWOH WUHDVXUHORVWLQD
QRRNRIRXUOHJDODWWLF¶per Willis J in Mineworkers Investment Company (Pty) Ltd v. Modibane 2002 (6) 
SA 512 (W) 20012 JDR 0465 (T) who held that the amende honorable was compatible with Constitutional 
norms and could require a defendant in a defamation action to be given an opportunity to make an 
appropriate public apology in lieu of paying damages (compare Van Niekerk v.v Radebe case no 00/21813 
where the freedom of expression implications are explored). The equivalent in Scotland, palinode, has 
SUREDEO\EHHQVXSHUVHGHGE\WKHVWDWXWRU\µRIIHURIDPHQGV¶LQVV-4 of the Defamation Act 1996 (c. 31). 
As far as the defence of privileged occasion is concerned, both Scots and South African law draw 
fundamental distinctions between absolute and qualified privilege and recogniserecognize that it is the 
occasion that is privileged rather than the communication itself or the person making the communication. 
49 See the authorities cited supra n.n. 32.  
50 See the text accompanying See above n. 32000. 
51 See J. Blackie, 'Defamation', in Reid and & Zimmermann,  History, 666 ff. Before the 19th Century, we 
can find, for example, Bankton, I, 10, 31, with a distinctly Roman-Dutch flavour reflected in modern South 
AfrLFDQODZTXRWLQJ9RHWWRWKHHIIHFWWKDWµveritas convitii non excusat a calumnia¶H[FHSWZKHUHLWLVWR
the good of the commonwealth to have the crime known and the words were not said with a design to 
reproach. 
52 Though the distinction was not so clear before the early 19th century as it is today: see K. Norrie, 'The 
Intentional Delicts', in Reid and & Zimmermann, History, 477-8; A. van Aswegen, 'Aquilian Liability I 
(Ninteenth Century)', in Zimmermann and & Visser, Southern Cross, 567-8. The crime of defamation 
exists in South African law and, strictly speaking, only applies to serious defamation. Fortunately, the 
criminal sanction is very seldom utilized, as the use of the criminal law to curb free speech is a highly 
debateable incursion into free speech: see Burchell, Defamation, ch. 26.   
53 In whose jurisdiction actions against honour originally lay: see Blackie n.(n. 51), 668. 
54 Chalmers v.v. Douglas (1785) Mor 13939 (wrongly cited by Blackie (n. 51) as 13989). 
55 The matter was conclusively settled, as far as Scots law is concerned, by the time of the decision in 
Mackellar v.v. Duke of Sutherland (1859) 21 D 222, in which the judges expressed some surprize that 
counsel considered the matter open to dispute. 
56 In Scotland too it has been stated, obiter, WKDWµ7UXWKLVQRWDOZD\VDMXVWLILFDWLRQRIOLEHO¶per Lord Deas 
in Friend v.v. Skelton 'DQGWKDWµ,DPQRWGLVSRVHGWRGRXEWWKDWWKHUHDUHVRPHNLQGV
of injurious publications, for which, according to our law, there may be a relevant claim of damages, 
although there is no slander. Examples of such a claim are afforded by cases in which some physical 
deformity or secret defect, such, for instance, as that peculiar defect in respect of which marriage may be 
annulled, is wantonly and oIIHQVLYHO\ SDUDGHG EHIRUH WKH SXEOLF¶ per Lord Deas in Cunningham v.v. 
Phillips (1868) 6 M 926, 928. He was delicately referring to impotency). Lord Deas is suggesting in both 
these cases that damages are claimable in circumstances in which there is no conceivable public interest 
served in broadcasting such true facts to the public. But this view did not catch, and there is no modern 
judicial statement to this effect. 
57 Supra n.n.5, 5, 1212B-C. The Constitutionality of the development of the common law in Bogoshi was 
subsequently affirmed in a unanimous judgment of the Constitutional Court in Holomisa.  
58 376 US 254 (1964).  
59 See Norrie, Defamation, 130-1; Burchell, Personality Rights, 224. 
60 At 1209I-J and 1212-3. See also Hamata v.v. Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary 
Committee 2000 (4) SA 621 (C), at para. 30 where the Cape High Court was prepared to accept, without 
GHFLGLQJ WKDW µXQWUXH VWDWHPHQWV PD\ EH ZRUWK\ RI FRQVWLWXWLRQDO SURWHFWLRQ DQG WKDW WKH PHUH IDFW WKDW
publication is IDOVHGRHVQRWWDNHLWRXWVLGHWKHSXUYLHZRIV¶WKHIUHHGRPRIH[SUHVVLRQFODXVH 
61 At 1212-3. 
62 See Burchell, Defamation, 206-9, espespecially . 207 n.n. 23 and Delict (1993), 174-175. 
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63 See Graham v.v. Kerr (1892) 9 SC 185, 187 per De Villiers &-µ3XEOLFLQWHUHVWZRXOGVXIIHUUDWKHUWKDQ
EHQHILWIURPDQ\XQQHFHVVDU\UHYLYLQJRIIRUJRWWHQVFDQGDOV¶&I/RUG'HDVLQFriend v.v. Skelton (1855) 
17D 548 '   ZKHUH KH VDLG WKDW LI WKH ZRUGV FRPSODLQHG RI FRQFHUQHG µVRPH ROG DQG
generaOO\IRUJRWWHQLPPRUDODFWRUDFWRILPSURSULHW\¶WKHQWKHWUXWKRIWKHZRUGVPLJKWDFWDVDPLWLJDWLRQ
(though not exculpation). 
64 Supra, (n. 5). 
65 ,QFOXGLQJDW\SHRIµQRUPDWLYH¶LQWHQWLRQDSSUR[LPDWLQJQHJOLJHQFHZKHUHWKHDEVHQFHRINQRZOHGJHRI
unlawfulness has to be reasonable, not merely bona fide) WRH[FXVHVHH9DQ'LMNKRUVW-¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI
National Media Ltd v.v. Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA), in Marais v.v. Groenewald 2001 (1) SA 634 
(T). See J. R. Midgleyµ0HGLDOLDELOLW\IRUDefamation¶,  (1999) 116 SALJ 211 at at 222. It would seem 
that the Constitutional Court in Khumalo v. Holomisa 2002 (2,8) BCLR 771 (CC), para. [20], has, by 
implication, rejected this approach to normative intention as a possible interpretation of Bogoshi, by clearly 
acknowledging a negligence-based liability for the media. 
66 Defamation Act 1996, s. 1 for Scotland; Trimble v.v. Central News Agency Ltd 1934 AD 43 for South 
Africa. One of the most significant forms of communication covered by s. 1 of the 1996 Act is electronic 
communication such as the internet. So network service operators and providers will be able to make use of 
this defence. The defence of absence of negligence would, in South Africa, be available to the media, in 
whatever shape or form: National Media Ltd v.v. Bogoshi 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA).   
67 It is not the purpose of this chapter to explore the peculiar Anglo-American concept of malice in 
defamation. For present purposes it can be taken to be roughly analogous to intent to injure. For a more 
sopKLVWLFDWHGDFFRXQW VHH30LWFKHOO µ0DOLFHLQ'HIDPDWLRQ¶, (1998) 114 LQR 639. In Adam v.v. Allan 
'/RUG-HIIULHVGHILQHGPDOLFHDVµDQLPRVLW\LOO-temper, love of scandal and gossip, or 
PHUHUDVKDQGWKRXJKWOHVVORTXDFLW\¶ 
68 Erskine, IV, 4, 80. 
69 [1910] AC 20. 
70 Blackie n.(n. 51), 657. 
71 Ibid., 662. 
72 (1763) Mor. 3436. 
73 See also Outram v.v. Reid (1852) 14D 577 to similar effect (the allegation there being one of 
bankruptcy). 
74 Guthrie Smith n.(n. 12,2), 202. 
75 This was certainly ErsNLQH¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHODZZULWLQJWHQ\HDUVDIWHUFinlay (though he does not 
mention that case): Erskine, IV, 4, 80. 
76 29 June 1809, FC. 
77 Guthrie Smith, n.(n. 12,2), 193. 
78 Hume, Lectures, III, 146. 
79 1909 2 SLT 315, 409. 
80 1960 (4) SA 836 (C) and Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit v.v. Kyriacou 2000 (4) SA 337 (O). 
81 1977 (3) SA 394 (A). 
82 1982 (3) SA 146 (A). See Burchell, Defamation, 185 ff et seq. 
83 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA), confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Khumalo v. Holomisa 2002 n.(8) 
BCLR 771 (CC).  
84 This is, of course, the underpinning justification for the law of privilege. 
85 National Media Ltd v. Bogoshin 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA)., 1211. The essence of what is sometimes 
FROORTXLDOO\UHIHUUHGWRDVWKHµULJKWRIUHSO\¶FDQWKHUHIRUe, be accommodated within the standard of the 
reasonableness of the publication: see Burchell, Personality Rights, 496-7. The standard of reasonableness 
also, in essence, underpins the approach of the European Court of Human Rights. The issue for that Court 
LV µSURSRUWLRQDOLW\¶ EHWZHHQ UHVWULFWLRQV RQ IUHH VSHHFK DQG WKH DLPV VRXJKW WR EH DFKLHYHG E\ WKH
restrictions. The Court has held that what must be taken into account includes the extent to which 
reputation is damaged, the reasonableness of the defendeU¶VHIIRUWVRUODFNRIHIIRUWVWRYHULI\LWVIDFWVDQG
LWVµYLWDOUROHRI³SXEOLFZDWFKGRJ¶¶¶Bladet Tromsø v.v. Norway (2000) 29 EHRR 125.   
86 See Burchell, Personality Rights, 226. 
87 Considered immediately below and in Burchell, Personality Rights, 309-14. 
88 New York Times v.v. Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964).  
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89 For a short exposition of the important cases, see Thomas Gibbons, 'Defamation Reconsidered',, (1996) 
16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 610-11. 
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